Nicole nadra baukus trial

Seiler in August. Fred Saunders, whose son Travis was killed after a drunk driving accident on Jun 29, , shows emotion while talking to the media during the sentencing of Nicole Baukus in the th state District Court of Judge Michael T. Seiler Friday. While public citizens do have a right to protect themselves and their families from known harm, the loss of individual rights over one's privacy can aggravate some of the very same goals the prison tries to achieve when it incapacitates and reforms offenders in the interests of public safety.

One positive impact that such online inmate search tools provide is an indirect kind of deterrent to crime. Criminologist John Braithewaite has argued for many years that modern day "shaming rituals" still exist, and indeed often serve very functional purposes for society, as a whole. Many argue that online databases can serve particularly well as shaming tools by reinforcing the deterrent effect of public outrage and public exhibition of one's crimes.

However, some states are more reluctant than others to share personal information on inmates to the public. South Dakota, for instance, has only until very recently maintained the secrecy of its inmate records from public searches, excluding sex offenders and prison escapees. The South Dakota Department of Corrections' spokesperson, Michael Winder, said in a recent Associated Press article as saying that he "hopes to" in the future include a public inmate search service that includes photographs and other personal information of offenders and parolees.

The original legislation was rejected in on grounds that hackers could corrupt the information on the website and expose the personal details of innocent people and defame them using "fictitious" criminal records.

The search term "Who is in Jail? Privacy and ethics issues aside, the public demand for offender information is staggering and likely to continue to be strong for many years. Already the public has online access to inmate lookup and inmate search services for most states in the U. On July 29, thirteen months after the fatal crash, Baukus stands trail.

With defense attorney Michael McDougal by her side, she pled not guilty. After four days of trial, Baukus changed her plea to guilty and elected to allow a jury of her peers to decide upon her punishment.

Charged with two counts of Intoxication Manslaughter and one count of Intoxication Assault with the possible addition of a deadly weapons charge, Baukus faces a maximum of 20 years for each manslaughter charge and 10 years for the assault charge.

Baukus already has six previous car accidents on her record. Once inside, she met her friend and her roommate, who worked at the bar, and had her first drink at p.

Over the next five hours, she consumed 21 alcoholic beverages and at 2 a. Witness for the state Oscar Williams, a TABC agent and certified peace officer, watched the video of Baukus in the bar numerous times, identifying those around her and counting drinks.

In the video, she demonstrated definite signs of intoxication, stumbling around and into people and tables. Eyewitness Keeleigh Mackay, a passenger of the vehicle Baukus almost struck, made the call to around 3 a. Already aware of a wrong way driver, the police were quick to respond and Shenandoah officer Todd Schmaltz soon arrived.

Officer Schmaltz found Baukus leaning against the passenger side of her F, left foot bleeding with the shoe and sock missing. He asked who was driving and Baukus, drunk and smelling strongly of alcohol, told him that a man had been driving but that she did not know where he was or even his name. She was also demonstrating some surprising actions for someone who had been in a serious head on collision.

Baukus was laughing and giggling to herself; unable to explain what she found so funny after two lives had just been lost. Schmaltz began to investigate the scene, looking for the man Baukus had claimed was driving. He could not be found. Eyewitness Buchanan also testified that he could see only one person in the vehicle when it cut across his lane before crashing into the Aveo. Bystanders had already pulled Porras from the vehicle, but it was the bodies of Nicole Adams in the front seat and Travis Saunders in the back seat that he was left to discover.

The Jaws of Life were necessary to extract the two victims. They were already obviously deceased from injuries including skull fractures and blunt fore trauma to the abdomen and chest. The story Baukus told soon changed when medics arrived and she admitted driving the vehicle. She also admitted, when she was at Hermann Memorial Hospital in the Woodlands, that she had been drinking. While Porras was next door being treated for his extensive injuries, including broken vertebrae, Baukus was complaining about having her clothing cut off by the nurses and about having to remove her rings.

Field, a general surgeon at Hermann Memorial, was tending to both Porras and Baukus. Her behavior startled Dr. Field just as much as it had Officer Schmaltz. He believed she was unaware of what had happened, so he told her she had killed two people and seriously injured another.

News like that could have been sobering. Some might expect denials, questions as to just what had happened, maybe confusion from the heavily intoxicated woman. At a. She was tested again at a. Expert witness Michael Manes, toxicology lab manager for the Houston Police Department, calculated that at the time of the crash, her blood-alcohol level was probably closer to.

Forty-three nanograms of diazepam, more commonly known as Valium, was also found in her blood. Manes labels this as a low therapeutic dose, but a doctor did not prescribe it.

Baukus claimed that she had been drugged and was not in control of herself at the time of the crash. However, this line of defense was dropped when she changed her plea to guilty on the fourth day of the trial. After the testimony of David Porras, which left the courtroom in tears, the mother of Travis Saunders was asked to testify. Travis, who had just become an uncle, was torn away prematurely, his life cut short. Travis, who had just graduated high school, was a bright young man with big dreams, doing anything he could to help anyone who needed it.

On the fourth day of trial, the prosecution rested. Just after pm Day 3 of the wrong way driver trial of Nicole Baukus wound down. The day had several experts testify including Woodlands Trooper Mike Chapman. After becoming a trooper he was certified in all six categories of accident investigation and is an also an instructor for other troopers in crash investigation. At that point they were moving more than feet per second. One again the number 21 came up. The analyst said the chances were 1 in 2 sextillion that the blood was not a match for Baukus.

Field with Hermann Hospital took the stand telling of the injuries he treated on both Baukus and Porras. He said Porras, upper jaw was shattered as was the bone and him losing all his upper teeth when the dashboard hit him in the face. He also spoke of his other neck injuries and having to continue going through surgeries. Field said Baukus had some fractures in her foot and other abrasions. At the time he did not think anyone had told Baukus that she had killed two people as she was laughing.

He was shocked when he broke the news to her and she laughed. We have edited it down from over 6 hours on 15 cameras to one camera in 20 minutes showing her taking each drink. Also at the 16 minute mark you see her leaving the club staggering across the parking lot. This morning prosecutor Andrew James presented a video which was captured from a freeway camera of Baukus entering the freeway at a.

You can see her tail lights as she travels north bound in the southbound lanes. Thinking it was a police officer he slowed down. As he approached it the vehicle his path at a forty five degree angle to the second lane of the freeway. He was able to hear the acceleration over his truck exhaust. He was able to see only one person in the vehicle as it passed just past his left side, he said it appeared the person was in the passenger seat.

He then saw the impact as Baukus hit the victims vehicle. During the punishment phase of trial, Baukus's counsel informed the trial court that Baukus was not going to testify on her own behalf. Baukus indicated that she understood the consequences of her decision not to testify. However, Baukus's trial counsel informed the court he did not believe Baukus really understood the consequences of her decision, but that he had to abide by his client's wishes.

The trial court then proceeded to call the jury back into the courtroom and after the jury was seated, the following exchange took place:. The trial court then swore Baukus in, and she took the stand to testify. Baukus's counsel questioned her regarding her desire to testify, as follows:.

Baukus also explained that she did not want to testify because there was evidence that she did not want shown to the people in the courtroom. On appeal, Baukus argues that when defense counsel called her to the stand to testify, the trial court should have questioned Baukus to determine whether Baukus made a voluntary choice to testify. She further contends that when she testified that she did "[n]ot really" want to testify, the trial court should have intervened. She contends the trial court's failure to intervene to determine whether her testimony was voluntary is evidence of the trial court's bias.

The United States Supreme Court has labeled a defendant's right to testify at trial as a fundamental constitutional right. Rock v. Arkansas, U. The Court held that a defendant's right to testify is derived from the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the United States Constitution, is personal to the defendant, and cannot be waived by counsel.

However, a defendant may knowingly and voluntarily waive this right. See Smith v. Johnson, F. Trial counsel bears the primary responsibility to inform a defendant of her right to testify and that the ultimate decision of whether she testifies belongs to the defendant. Johnson, S. Baukus does not contend she was compelled to testify against her will by the trial court or even coerced by the court to waive any such right. The trial court had no duty to independently determine whether Baukus's testimony was otherwise voluntary.

Baukus expressly acknowledged to the trial court that she was aware of her right not to testify and voluntarily waived such right. We conclude that Baukus has failed to show any bias on the part of the trial judge. See Gagnon, U. We overrule Baukus's third issue. In her sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, tenth, and eleventh issues, Baukus complains that she was forced to testify during the punishment phase of trial. In her sixth issue, Baukus contends she was denied her right to choose to testify.

In her seventh issue, she contends she was denied her privilege against self-incrimination. In her eighth and eleventh issues, she contends she was called as a witness without her consent and in violation of her right to effective assistance of counsel. In her ninth and tenth issues, she contends the trial court erred in allowing her trial counsel to force her to testify. Because the underlying basis of all of these issues is Baukus's contention that she was denied her right to decide whether to testify during the punishment phase, we first look to the appellate record to determine if it supports Baukus's claim.

In the affidavit supporting her motion for new trial, Baukus unequivocally indicated that she understood she had the right to decide whether to testify. She stated:.

In support of the State's response to Baukus's motion for new trial, the State attached defense counsel's affidavit. Therein, defense counsel acknowledged that Baukus was reluctant to testify because she did not want to risk certain exhibits being shown to people in the courtroom, notably, her parents. As noted above, we generally presume a defendant represented by counsel made the decision to testify voluntarily and with full knowledge of her rights; however, here, we need not employ this presumption because it is clear from the record that Baukus understood her rights and chose to waive those rights in electing to testify.

Baukus stated clearly in her affidavit that the trial court informed her that it was her decision as to whether she testified. There is no evidence in the record that Baukus was coerced or otherwise forced to testify against her will. Baukus has not presented any basis for this Court to conclude that she believed that, if she had invoked her right to silence, she would have been punished or penalized by the trial court for asserting that right.

See Johnson v. There is no evidence in the record to indicate what conversation, if any, occurred between Baukus and her counsel or Baukus and her parents while the jury was out. Upon the jury's return, Baukus's counsel indicated to the court that he was going to call Baukus as a witness after all. In response, Baukus took the stand and testified without asserting her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination or otherwise indicating to her counsel or the court that she unequivocally did not want to testify.

Baukus's response of "[n]ot really" to defense counsel's question regarding whether Baukus wanted to testify is insufficient to overcome the presumption that she testified voluntarily, especially in light of the evidence indicating she knew and understood she had a right to refuse to testify. Because the record does not support Baukus's contention that her testimony during the punishment phase of trial was involuntary, we overrule Baukus's sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, tenth, and eleventh issues.

In her twelfth issue, Baukus claims her pleas of "true" to the deadly-weapon allegations were not voluntary because her counsel did not inform her she could plead guilty to the charges in the indictment and still enter pleas of "not true" to the deadly-weapon allegations. She claims she would have entered a plea of not true if counsel had fully advised her.

As described above in detail, the trial court questioned Baukus at length regarding whether her decision to change her pleas was knowing and voluntary. After Baukus entered pleas of "guilty" to the three offenses with which she had been charged, Baukus entered pleas of "true" to each deadly-weapon allegation and stated that she was doing so voluntarily, of her own free will, and understanding the nature and consequences of her pleas. In her first affidavit to her motion for new trial, Baukus stated that her defense counsel never told her the consequences of entering pleas of "true" to the deadly-weapon allegations or otherwise inform her of her options.

She contends that her counsel did not discuss her pleading "true" to the deadly-weapon allegation until they were in court, just before she entered her pleas. She stated that counsel did not explain and she did not understand that she could enter pleas of guilty to the charged offenses and still enter pleas of "not true" to the deadly-weapon allegations.

For Baukus to have her pleas of "true" set aside on the basis that her pleas were involuntary due to ineffective assistance of counsel, she must establish that her counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and a reasonable probability exists that, but for counsel's ineffectiveness, the result of the proceeding would have been different.

See Strickland, U. Under the prejudice prong of Strickland, Baukus must show there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, she would have entered a plea of "not true" and would have insisted on proceeding to trial on the deadly-weapon allegation.

See Hill, U. State, 68 S. In our determination, we consider the totality of the circumstances surrounding the pleas and the gravity of the alleged failure material to that determination. See Moody, S. State, 45 S.

If an appellant fails to prove one prong of the Strickland test, we need not reach the other prong. Strickland, U. State, 57 S. Baukus contends that if she had known that she could have entered a plea of "not true" after pleading "guilty" to the intoxication manslaughter and intoxication assault charges, she would have pled "not true" and insisted on going to trial.

By statutory definition, a deadly weapon is "anything that in the manner of its use or intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury. To establish a deadly-weapon finding, the State must establish that: 1 the object meets the statutory definition of a dangerous weapon; 2 the weapon was used or exhibited during the transaction from which the felony conviction was obtained; and 3 other people were actually endangered.

Drichas v. In pleading guilty to the intoxication manslaughter charges and the intoxication assault charge, Baukus, in effect, pled guilty to causing the death of two people and seriously injuring a third person with her truck because she was too intoxicated to operate the vehicle properly.

The overwhelming evidence in the record showed that Baukus drove her vehicle up an exit ramp of I in the wrong direction at a high rate of speed into oncoming traffic and collided with a Chevy Aveo, thereby killing two people and seriously injuring a third. Before Baukus changed her plea to true to the deadly weapon finding, several witnesses had already testified as to her actions that evening and video of the gruesome resulting accident had been played to the jury.

A deadly-weapon finding would have been justified in that a rational jury could have concluded that the appellant's vehicle posed an actual danger of death or serious bodily injury.

Baukus submitted an affidavit stating, "If he had told me I did not have to plead true to the [deadly-weapon] allegation, I would not have pled true. I would have insisted on a jury trial[. Considering all the circumstances surrounding the plea and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling, we conclude Baukus has failed to show there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, she would have entered a plea of "not true" and would have insisted on proceeding to trial on the deadly-weapon allegation.

The trial court could reasonably have disbelieved Baukus's affidavit testimony, especially in light of her pleas of "guilty" to the intoxication manslaughter and intoxication assault charges. See Riley v. We conclude that Baukus failed to demonstrate prejudice from trial counsel's conduct.

Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Baukus's motion for new trial, and we overrule Baukus's twelfth issue.

In her thirteenth issue, Baukus contends the trial court erred in refusing to allow Baukus to offer evidence that the blood of Saunders, one of the victims, tested positive for THC use. Baukus contends the trial court's error was prejudicial to her because the State offered the false testimony that Saunders did not do drugs and invited the jury to compare the value of Saunders's life with that of Baukus's.

Evidence is relevant if it has the tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury. We review a trial court's decision to admit or exclude evidence under an abuse of discretion standard. De La Paz v.

As long as the trial court's ruling falls within the zone of reasonable disagreement, we will affirm the trial court's decision. Moses v. The exclusion or admission of evidence does not result in reversible error unless it affects a substantial right of the defendant. Saunders's mother testified during the punishment phase of trial. When asked what went through her mind when she found out Saunders had been killed, she responded:. Defense counsel sought to enter the results from Saunders's toxicology report indicating that his blood had tested positive for THC active ingredient of marijuana.

Defense counsel argued the finding was relevant to impeach the impressions left by the mother's testimony that Saunders did not do drugs. The trial court denied defense counsel's request and found that the evidence was inadmissible because it was not relevant. Victim-impact evidence can help assist the jury in assessing the defendant's personal responsibility and moral guilt in terms of the trauma or loss the defendant's actions caused.

See Miller-El v. However, negative victim-impact evidence sought to be admitted to show that the defendant's punishment should be lessened because of the victim's character is not permissible. In Clark v. State, the defendant sought to introduce evidence that the victim was not a person of good character. The defendant offered the evidence during punishment on the grounds that the jury might find that the defendant was a greater threat to society if they believed he murdered a particularly valuable member of the community; whereas the jury might have placed less value on the victim's life if they knew her true character.

In dicta, the Court of Criminal Appeals disagreed with the defendant's argument "in suggesting that the decedent's behavior indicated that she was not a particularly valuable member of the community and that her life might have had more value had she been of a different character.

While Baukus's argument is not identical to the argument put forth in Clark, Baukus does state that "the saint-like qualities of the victim's character. Despite her contention that this evidence was admissible to rebut the false impression that Saunders did not abuse drugs, the evidence amounts to negative victim-impact evidence, offered to show that the victim abused drugs. Evidence of the victim's drug use was not admissible for this purpose.